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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of • • • 1rg1ma 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record 2161 
J. E. SPICKARD 
versus 
CITY OF LYNCHBURG, VIRGI 
PETITION FOR.WRIT OF ERROR AND 8 ERSE DE.AS. 
To tke Honorable the Chief Justice and .As ociate Justices 
of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virgi;n a: 
Your petitioner, J. E. Spickard, respectfilly represents 
that he is greatly aggrieved by a judgment of e Corporation 
Court for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, r ndered on the 
5th day of December, 1938, against him, in a rtain criminal 
case, finding him guilty of unlawfully operatin an automobile 
while under the influence of intoxicants, in viol tion of Section 
259 of the City Code of Lynchburg, Virginia, and fixing his 
punishment at a fine of $150.00 and cost . A duly au-
2* thenticated *transcript of the record is ereto attached 
and it is prayed that the same may be r d and treated 
as a part of this petition. 
THE CHARGE AGAINST PETITI NER. 
The charge against petitioner (hereinafter referred to as 
defendant) originated in the Municipal Court of the City of 
Lynchburg, Virginia. (No warrant was issue . ) The charge 
against the defendant was that defendant did in said city on 
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the ........ day of October, 1938, unlawfully operate an auto-
mobile under the influence of whiskey in violation of Section 
259 of the· City Code of Lynchburg, ,Virginia. Upon convic-
tion by ·the Judge of the Municipal Court, the defendant 
prayed for and was allowed an appeal to the Corporation 
Court, in which he was likewise found guilty and a fine of 
$150.00 and costs was imposed upon him. 
THE ORDINANCE UNDER "\VHICH THE DEFENDANT 
WAS CONVICTED. 
The ordinance under which the defendant was convicted 
is Section 259 of the City Code of Lynchburg, Virginia, 
which is as follows: 
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or oper-
ate any automobile or other motor vehicle, car, truck, engine 
or train while under· the influence of alcohol, brandy, rum, 
whiskey, gin, wine, beer, lager beer, ale, porter, stout, or 
any other liquid, beverage or article containing alcohol, or 
while under the influence of any narcotic drug or any other 
self-administered intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature. 
*'' (b) Any person who violates any provision of this 
3:1: ordinance shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable 
by a fine of not less than $100.00 nor more than $1;000.00, 
or imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than 
six months, either or both in the discretion of the judge try-
ing the same, for a first offense, and the court may, in its dis-
. cretion, suspend the sentence during the good behavior of the 
person convicted.'' 
OTHER ORDINANCES WHICH THE DEFENDANT 
CONTENDS WERE PERTINENT AND 
APPLICABLE. 
The defendant contends that he was entitled to an instruc-
tion on reckless driving, and, therefore, deems it pertinent 
at this time to ~et out the following sections of the City Code 
of Lynchburg with reference to reckless driving: 
Section 196 : 
(a) '' * * * any person who drives a vehicle upon a hig·hway 
recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger 
or be likely to endanger life, limb or property of any person 
shall be guilty of reckless driving * • * . '' 
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(b) 
(1) "Drive a vehicle when not under prope control * * * . " 
( c) "Every person convicted of reckless dr ving under .this 
section shall, for a first violation, be punished by a fine of not 
less than ten dollars nor more than one hun red dollars, or 
by imprisonment in jail for not more than thirty days, o~ by 
both such fine and imprisonment;'' 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The defendant assigns as error the actio of the Court 
in entering up a judgment of conviction !against him, on 
4• the ground *that the same is contrary to he law and the 
evidence for the following reasons : 
(1) The Court erred in not instructing the ury on reckless 
driving, which instruction was requested a d refused (R., 
pp. 8-9); and also in refusing to give defenda1 t 's Instructions 
F and G (R., pp. 11-12), which instructions were requested 
and refused. 
(2) The Court erred in refusing to give tlefendant's In-
struction E (R., pp. 10-11), which instructio was requested 
and refused. · 
These were the contentions made, without success, m the 
trial court, and are reiterated here. 
The questions involved in this petition for a writ of error 
are as follows : 
(A) Whether or not the Court erred in ref sing· to give an 
instruction on reckless driving and the punis rnent therefor, 
and also in refusing to instruct the jury tha where the de-
fendant is charged with two separate and istinct offenses 
and the jury believes from the evidence, beyo cl a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant is guilty of some ffense charged, 
but has a reasonable doubt as to the offense of which he is 
guilty, they must give the defendant the ben t of the doubt 
and convict him of the lesser offense, reckl ss driving; and 
5'"' * (B) ·whether or not _the Court erre in refusing to 
instruct the jury that before there can e a conviction 
for driving under the influence of intoxicant , the burden is 
upon the City of Lynchburg to prove tl1at th defendant was 
under the influence of intoxicants to such an extent that bis 
ability to drive with safety to himself and oth rs was thereby 
materially impaired. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
The facts out of which this controversy arose may be briefly 
summarized as follows: 
J. E. Spickard, a resident of Lowry, Bedford County, Vir-
ginia, on the 4th da.y of October, 1938, about 7 P. M., while 
driving his Ford automobile in the City of Lynchburg, Vir-
ginia, was arrested by F. L. Grubbs and J. E. Mitchell, both 
police officers of the said City of Lynchburg. The officers tes-
tified that the defendant was very much under the influence 
of liquor, and that before they stopped his car Spickard would 
cut his car from one side of the street to the other. E. 0. 
Murphy, who was Desk Sergeant of the Police Force for the 
City of Lynchburg, testified that Spickard was brought into 
the Police Station at 7 :17 P. M. and appeared to be intoxi-
cated, and that there was no delay in charging him with oper-
ating an automobile while intoxicated. J. E. Spickard testi-
fied that he was a mail carrier in Bedford County, Virginia; 
that on the day in question he was not in any way under the 
influence of intoxicants, •though he admitted having taken 
6• two small drinks before he reached the City of Lynch-
burg; that when the officers arrested him, as it was the 
first time he had ever been arrested for anything, he became 
very nervous and upset. He denied that his car went from 
one side of the street to the other for a long distance, but 
stated that he did look in his rear view mirror .on several 
occasions and by doing so his car may have gone a. little from 
one side of the street to the other, once or twice; that as soon 
as the police blew their siren he stopped, and that on the way 
to the Police Station the officers told him that they would have 
to charge him with reckless driving·. The officers denied mak-
ing this statement. Spickard testified that he did not know 
that he was charged with driving under the influence of in-
toxicants until after he had been in the Police Station for 
quite a while, and then one of the officers informed him. A 
number of reputable people from the County of Bedford tes-
tified that the defendant's repufa~.tion for being a law-abiding 
citizen was good, and that his general reputation in the com-
munity in which he lived for truth and veracity was good, 
and that krnnving his reputation as they did they ';VOuld be-
lieve him under oath in a matter in which he was personally 
interested. 
The facts are controverted in this case. 
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. ·7* * ARGUMENT . 
(1) The. defendant was entitled to an inst uction on reck-
less driving (R., pp. 8-9), and also an instru tion on convic-
tion of a lesser offense (Defendant's Instruct" n G, R., p. 12)-, 
and an instruction for the punishment of reck1ess driving, etc. 
(Defendant's Instruction F, R., p. 11.) · 
The defendant contends that reckless dri ing is a minor 
or lesser offense than driving under the infl ence of intoxi-
cants, as the punishment is less, and that re kless driving is 
an ingredient of the offense of driving under the influence of 
intoxicants under the ordinances as set out o pages 2 and 3 
of this petition. If this contention be uphe d, then the de-
fendant was entitled to an instruction on rec ess driving. 
In the case of Barton v. State (Ga.), 199 S. . 357 (1938),' at 
page 358, this is said : 
'''Vhere a charge of graver character incl des a minor of-
fense, if the evidence will justify a verdict finding the de-
fendant guilty of the minor offense, it is the d ty of the judge 
to instruct the jury as to the principles o~ law applicable 
thereto. The graver offense must either ne essarily include 
the minor offense, or the indictment must cha ge the essential 
elements of the minor offense. To state the ule as strongly 
as possible, the jury should in all cases be instructed that 
the defendant may be convicted of the lesse offense neces-
sarily involved in the graver offense, where t e evidence. sub-
mitted, under any view thereof, will authori e conviction of 
the lesser grade. '' 
The law seems to be well settled in this Co monwealth that 
where a major offense is charged all lesser offenses 
g«< which *are incident to, arid are elemen ,s of it, are in-
cluded. 
McDaniel v. C01nmon,weaUh, 165 Va. 709 . 
. Tucker v. Co1nnw·nwealth, 159 Va. 1038. 
Richards v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1073. 
As shown by the record there was a grea conflict of evi-
dence, for not only did the officers testify th t the def e11dant 
was driving from one side of the street to e other, which 
would certainly be reckless driving, but that le was also very 
much intoxicated, whereas the defendant tesf ed that he was 
not intoxicated or under the influence of into icants, but that 
he may have cut across the street once or twi e when looking 
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into his rear view mirror. So from this evidence the jury 
might have found the defendant guilty of driving under the 
influence of intoxicants, or it might have found the defendant 
guilty of reckless driving·. ( The punishment for reckless 
driving is much less than for driving under the influence of in-
toxicants-Petition, pp. 2-3.) 
In referring to the definition of reckless driving and driving 
under the influence of intoxicants, as set out on pages 2 and 3 
of this petition. to our minds there does not seem to be any 
question but that reckless driving is an ingredient of driving 
under the influence of intoxicants, for one may be convicted 
of reckless driving who drives his automobi]e in a manner 
so as to endanger or be likely to endanger life, limb *or 
9• property of any person, or one may be convicted of reck-
less driving where he does not have his car under proper 
control. How could any one be convicted of driving under 
the influence of intoxicants and not be guilty of reckless driv-
ing? The Court will take judicial notice that any one under 
the influence of intoxicants would certainly not have his car 
under proper control, for it is an undisputed fact that a person 
under the influenee of intoxicants has not full control over all 
his faculties. 
Therefore, the contention of the defendant is that under 
ordinances as we have here for construction, a person may 
be guilty of reckless driving, but not of driving under the in-
fluence of intoxicants, but for a person to be guilty of driving 
under the influence of intoxicants, he must be guilty of reck-
less driving·. Under these ordinances reckl~ss driving is an in-
gredient of driving under the influence of intoxicants, and 
under the charge of driving· under the influence of intoxicants 
the defendant is entitled to an instruction on reckless driving. 
In 17 C. J., page 344, Section 3697 ( i), this is said: 
'' Where there was evidence from ,vhich might be drawn a 
reasonable inference that the crime was of a lesser degree than 
the one of which defendant was convicted, it was prejudicial 
error to submit to the jury the consideration of only the higher 
grade of crime." · 
10* * ALTHOUGH RECKLESS DRIVING NOT SPE-
CIFICALLY CHARGED, YET DEFENDANT 
"r AS ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUC-
TION THEREON. 
In 16 C. J., page 1042, Section 2484(2), this is said: 
'' It has been held that an instruction may be based on evi-
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dence relative to the incidents of the offens , although such 
incidents were not alleged.'' 
And also in 16 C. J., page 1043, Section 248 ( c), this is said: 
'' The questions of the sufficiency of instr ctions must be 
determined always by the facts of each case, a d an instruction 
which states a correct proposition of law a d which is sup-
ported by, or applicable to, the facts in eviden I e is proper, and 
it is error to refuse it, if requested." 
The question as to whether a defendant is ntitled to an in-
struction on reckless driving· is n nm,el 01 e. Neither the 
judiciary in this state, nor in any other sta e that we have 
been able to find, has ever been called upon to pass on this 
question, with ordinances as we have in this ase. The lower 
courts seem to be divided as to whether ai1 ins ruction on reck-
less driving should be.given or. not. ~e havf. been informed 
· that some courts do give such, rnstruct10n, w~ile other courts 
refuse to give it, and we respectfully sub~it that the law 
on this question should be settled. And we urther respect-
fully submit that the defendant was enf led in this case 
11 * to an instruction on •·reckless driving, and the refusal 
of the Court to grant an instruction on eckless driving 
was prejudicial error. 
(2) The defendant was entitled to Instru ion E (R., pp. 
10-11). · 
Although this Court held in the case of Oi en v. Conimon-
wealth, 147· Va. 624 (1927), at page 629, th t the Common-
wealth did not have the burden of proving th t the defendant 
was under the influence of intoxicants to sue an extent that 
his ability to drh1e with safety to himself nd others was 
thereby materially impaired, it is most respec fully submitted 
that the Court erred in this holding, and ti at that opinion 
should, he reversed because, in determining rhether the de-
fendant is under the influence of intoxicants r not, the jury 
certainlv should be instructed as to what it is necessarv for 
the evidence to show in order to convict him f driving linder 
the influence of intoxicants. 
12* *CONCLUSION. 
Your petitioner, heretofore referred to as d fendant, there-
fore prays that a writ of error and su,pe sedeas may be 
awarded to the judgment of the Corporatio1 Court for the 
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City of Lynchburg, Virginia, ent~red as aforesaid, that the 
same may be reversed and set aside, and that the case be or-
dered dismissed, or that your petitioner may be granted a new 
trial. 
Counsel for petitioner desire to state orally the reasons 
for reviewing the judgment complained of, and in accordance 
with the rules of this Court, on the 28th day of February, 
1939, mailed to "\V. T. Spencer, Jr., Esquire, Commonwealth's 
Attorney for the City of Lynchburg, .Virginia, opposing coun-
sel in the trial court, a copy of this petition, and will present 
and file this petition with the Honorable George L. Brown-
ing, one of the Justices of this Court, at his office in Orange, 
Virginia, on March 1, 1939 (the Court being in vacation at 
that time). This petition is adopted by the petitioner as his 
opening brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. EASLEY EDMUNDS, JR., 
PAUL WHITEHEAD, 
309 Krise Building, 
Lynchburg, Virginia. 
J. E. SPICKARD, 
By Counsel. 
13• ""We . .T. EiHiley Edmunds. Jr., and Paul Whitehe.ad, 309 
Krise Building, Lynchbury, Virginia, attorneys duly 
qualified to practice in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
g;inia, do state and certify that, in our opinion, th~ judgment 
complained of in the case of the City of Lynchburg, Virgfoia, 
'lJ • • r. E. Spickard ought to be reviewed by the said Supreme 
Court of Appeals. 
Received 3-1-39. 
J. EASLEY EDMUNDS, ,JR~, 
PAUL "WHITEHEAD. 
GEORGE L. BROWNING. 
Anril 18, 1939. Writ of error and s·upersedeaR awarded 
by the court. Bond, $200. 
M.B.W .. 
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RECORD· 
VIRGINIA.: 
Pleas before the Honorable Aubrey E. S ode, Judge of 
the corporation court for the city of Lyn burg, at the 
courthouse thereof, on the 5th day or Dece her, 1938, and 
in the 163rd year of the Commonwealth. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit., h the case of 
City of Lynchburg against J. E. Spickard, the ollowing judg-
ment was entered in the municipal court of the City of Lynch-
burg, to-wit: 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
City of Lynchburg, to-wit: 
Be it remembered that on this 11th day of October, 1938, 
J. E. Spickard, brought before me, Judge o the City of 
Lynchburg, charged with a misdemeanor in t · s, that he did 
in said city on the . . . . . . day of October, 1 8, unlawfully 
operate auto under the influence of whiskey, w s by me, upon 
evidence on oath of F. L. Grubbs, et al., found guilty of said 
offense, wherefore I adjudge that he pay a fin of $100.00 & 
$5.00 cost. 
But the said J. E. Spickard having pray d. an appeal 
from my said judgment, an appeal is hereby ranted to the 
next term of the Corporation Court of Lyne urg, and the 
said judg·ment and conviction, as well as the aid appeal, is 
hereby certified to said Court. 
Given under my hand this 11th day of Octo r, 1938. 
JOS. P. McCAR.R N, Judge. 
page 2 ~ At another day, to-wit: At Lynch urg Corpora-
tion Court, November 18th, 1938. 
City of Lynchburg 
v . 
• J. E. Spickard, (white), Defendant. 
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UPON APP.EAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT UPON A 
CHARGE OF DRIVING DRUNK. 
This day came the City of Lynchburg by the Com.mon-
wealth 's Attorney, and the said J. E. Spickard appeare·d by 
his attorney, as well as in his own proper person in discharge 
of his recognizance, and said parties demanding a jury, there 
came a jury, to-wit, Vv. A. Ambrose, C. D. Candler, Jr., C. A. 
Graham, F. C. Hackworth and J. Ellis Hall, who were sworn 
to try the issue joined, and having heard the evidence and ar-
gument of counsel,. returned the following verdict, to-wit, 
''We the jury find 'the defendant guilty and fix his fine at 
$150.00. W. A. Ambrose, Foreman". Thereupon, the de-
fendant by his attorney, moved the court to set aside said 
verdict on the ground that it is contrary to the law and the 
evidence, etc., and the court not being advised of its judg-
ment to be given in the premises, takes time to consider 
thereof. And the defendant's recognizance shall remain in 
full force and effect until this case is finally disposed of, ac-
cording· to law. 
page 3 ~ And now at this day, to-wit: At Lynchburg Cor-
poration Court, December 5th, 1938, the date first 
hereinbefore mentioned. 
City of Lynchburg 
v. 
J. E. Spickard, (white), Defendant. 
UPON APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT UPON A 
CHAR.GE OF DRIVING DRUNK. 
This day came the City of Lynchburg by the Common-
wealth's attorney, and the said J. E. Spickard appeared by 
his attorney, as well as in his own proper person· in discharge 
of his recognizance, and it appearing that on the 18th day 
of November, 19:-38, the defendant was convicted of operat-
i~~: an ~utomobile while under the influence of whiskey, and 
Ins pumshment fixed at a fine of $150.00, by the verdict. of 
the jury, and the court having maturely considered the de-
fendant's motion to set aside said verdict, on the gTouncl that 
it is contrary to the law and the evidence, etc., doth overrule 
said motion, to which action and ruling of the court the de-
fendant by ]1is attorney excepted. It is therefore considered 
by the court that the said ,T. E. Spickard forfeit and pa.y to 
the City of Ly·nchburg the sum of $150.00, the amount of 
the fine af ore~ai~, that he pay the costs of this prosecution, 
.J. E. Spickard v. City of Lynchburg, 
F. L. Grubbs. 
11 
and that he be committed to the city farm u til payment of 
said fine and costs, provid~d that such term n the city farm 
shall not exceed two months. At the instanc of the defend-
ant by his attorney who intimated his intent" n to apply for 
a writ of error and supersedeas, the court oth order that 
execution of the foregoing judgment be su ended for the 
period of sixty days from this date; and the de endant's recog-
nizance shall remain in full force and e:ff ect until this case 
is finally disposed of, according· to law. 
page 4 ~ City of Lynchburg-
v • 
• J. E. Spickard. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTIO rs. 
Be It Remembered and the Court does her by certify that 
at the trial of this case the following evidence as introduced 
on behalf of the City of Lynchburg and the efendant: 
EVIDENCE FOR THE CITY OF LYN 
F. L.GRUBBS 
testified that he is a police officer of the Cit of Lynchburg, 
Virginia. That on October 4, 1938, about 6: 8 P. M., he re-
ceived a call to be on the lookout for a Ford~oupe, bearing 
Virginia license -No. 256-129, running all over the road; that 
as he, accompanied by police officer J. E. i ·tchell, arrived 
at OaklBy Avenue in the City of Lynchburg, ere was a car 
coming· down the street at a low speed and ruml·ng all over the 
road; that they followed the car several blocks and that every 
time they would try to get opposite it so that hey could stop 
it, the car would cut over and prevent them, and that when 
they stopped the car the driver was so drunk e could hardly 
talk. That the driver was ,J. E. Spickard. tl e defendant in 
this case. That on the right floor board w·as a art of a bottle 
of wine, and there was also part of a bottle of whiskey in the 
car with A. B. C. stamps on it, a bottle of bee and an empty 
wine jug-. That Mr. Spickard was driving· a F rd V-8 Coupe, 
bearing the above license, and in the back were two 
page 5 r rifles which were loaded; that they n er told Spick-
ard they were going to charge hi with reckless 
driving, but put a charge of driving under t e influence of 
intoxicants ag·ainst him as soon as he was hro ght to the po· 
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J. E. Mitchell-E. 0. Murphy-J. E. Spickard 
lice station. That Spickard was arrested in th~ City of Lynch-
burg, Va. 
el. E. MITCHELL 
testified that he is a police officer of the City of Lynchburg, 
and that he was present when Mr. Grubbs arrested Spickard; 
that before they arrested him he was driving from one side 
of the street to the other, and that he was very much under 
the inlluence of liquor by his speech and actions.. That Spick-
a.rd i;;aid he and his wife had been having trouble. 
E. 0. MURPHY 
testified that he is desk sergeant of the police force for the 
City of Lynchburg, Virg'inia, and that on October 4, 1938,. 
Spickard was brought into the police station, that he was not 
steady on his feet, appeared to be intoxicated, and there was 
no delay in charging him with operating an automobile while 
intoxicated. That he was brought here at 7 :17 P. M. at night. 
The City of Lynchburg rested. 
EVIDE.NCE FOR THE DEFENDANT. 
J. E. SPICKARD 
testified that he is the defendant in the case, that he lived 
at Lowry in Bedford County, Virginia, about ten miles out-
side of the City of Lynchburg, and that he was a mail carrier 
in Bedford County. That on the day of his arrest he returned 
to his home a.bout noon, that he worked on the farm until late 
iu the day, a11d that he then left his home, in his car by him-
self, for the City of Lynchburg. That he had had the whiskev 
and wine in his car for a number of days, and tha't 
page 6 ~ he carried the rifles in his car all the time as he was 
required to ca.rry a gun while on his mail route, and 
that he left the rifles in his car at all times. That he took 
two small drinks before he reached the City of Lynchburg·, 
that he was not in any way under the influence of liquor but 
that when the officers arrested liim, being· still in the car by 
himse]f, as it was the first time he ever had been arrested he 
became verv nervous and unset. That he did look in his rear 
view mirro~ on several occasions and by doing so his car may 
have gone a little from one side of the street to the othei·, 
but that he stopped his car immediately wl1en the police blew 
their siren. That thev came over to his car and talked with 
him, and that on the way to the police station they told him 
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W. C. Stone, Jr., John JI. Bell, H. B. Gordo 0. E. Gibson, 
L. Fl.. Mason, J. W. Woodford and K. H. atterson. 
they would have to charge him with reckless driving. That 
after he had been in the police station for a good while he 
finally asked an officer there couldn't he leave as he was only 
-charged with reckless driving, and that the qfficer later in-
formed him that he was charged wit~ drivin~ under the in-
fluence. of intoxicants, which was the first t · e he_ had any 
knowledge of it. That he may have gone, while looking 
through the rear view mirror, from one side f the street to 
the other once or twice, but that he positively as not in any 
way under the i.nfluence of intoxicants, though he did become 
nervous and upset when the officers arrested im. 
W. C. STONE, JR., JOHN M. BELL, H. B GORDON, 0. 
E. GIBSON, L. H. MASON, J. W. WOODF RD AND K. 
H. PATTERSON, 
All testified that they were from Bedford Co nty, Virginia, 
and knew the defendant, J. E. Spickard; that hi general repu-
. tatiou for being a law-abiding citizen as good; that 
page 7 ~ his general reputation in the comm . nity in which 
_ he lived for truth and veracity was ood, and that 
knowing his reputation as they did, they wo d believe him 
under oath in a matter in which he was person lly interested. 
The defendant rested. 
The foreg·oing was all the testimony adduce. at said trial. 
page 8 ~ The following· instructions were iven and ob-
jections and exceptions were made as to instruc-
tions given and refused, as hereinafter set out 
CITY OF LYNCHBURG'S INSTRUC IONS. 
The Commonwealth's Attorney requested t e Court to in-
struct t~e jury, orally, which the Court did as f' Hows: 
The Court instructs the jury that the City of Lynchburg 
must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he defendant, 
J". E. Spickard, was operating his car in the ity of Lynch-
burg·~ Virginia, on October 4, 1938, under the i fluence of in-
toxicants, and if they believed beyond a reason ble doubt that 
he was guilty~ then they should punish him b a fine of not 
less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or impris nment for not 
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less than one month nor more than six months, either or both, 
in their discretion. 
At this point defendant by counsel requested the Court to· 
instruct the j11ry· ~n reckless driving as follows: 
. . . 
That if they" believed from the evidence, beyond a reason-
able doubt, that ,J. E. Spickard drove his automobile upon 
the highways of the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, when not 
under proper control, or recklessly, or at a speed or in a man-
ner so as to endanger or be likely 'to endanger the life, limb 
or property of any person, he shall be guilty of reckless driv-
~~ ' 
which. the Court refused to do, and defendant by counsel ob-
jected ou the grounds that there was _evidence to the effect 
that the defendant was g·uilty of reckless driving·, that he was 
entitled to an instruction on reckless driving, that the de-
fendant was prejudiced by the Court's refusal to g·ive this 
instruction, that the jury was not fully instructed as to the 
law in this case without such an instruction being given; that 
the crime of reckless driving is embraced in the charge of 
driving under the influence of intoxicants; and that 
page 9 ~ the crime of reckless driving· is a minor or lesser 
offense, and is an ing-redient of the major or greater 
crime of driving under the influence of intoxicants. The Court 
overruled the objection of the defendant by counsel, to which 
ruling- of the Court the defendant by cpunsel duly excepted. 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTIONS. 
The following instructions were given for the def enclant: 
Defendant's Instnwtion A. 
The Court instructs the jury that there is no burden on 
the defendant to prove anything, and that the entire burden 
rests upon the City of !...1ynchburg to prove the guilt of the 
defendant under the evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt, 
and that it is one of the cardinal rules of the law of evidence, 
regardless of the crime charged, that the defendant is pre-
sumed to be innocent, and that nothing need be proven by the 
defendant, nor is any evidence necessary on his behalf, for the 
presumption of innocence on his behalf is a legal presump-
tion, and that presum11tion of innocence does not cease when 
the jury retires, but accompanies the defendant throughout 
thfl trial, and until the jury render their verdict, and this pre-
sumpti9n of innocence in a doubtful case, regardless of any 
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suspicion and probabilities, is always suffic ent to turn the 
sca]e in favor of the accused and cause his acquittal. 
Defendant's Instruction B. 
The Court instructs the jury that if upo the whole evi-
dence in the case, there is any rational hypo hesis consistent 
with the innocence of the accused, they mu t find him not 
guilty. Since a verdict of "not guilty" mea s nothing more 
than that the City of Lynchburg has not pr ved its case to 
your satisfaction, beyond a reasonable dou . 
D·efendant's lnstriiction C. 
The Court instructs the jury that evidence the good char-
acter of the accused is highly important in doubtful case, 
that it is not a make weight to be lightly co sidered, but is 
positive and substantial evidence of the de endant 's inno-
cence in a doubtful case and may of itself ralse a reasonable 
doubt in a doubtful case as to defendant's guilt and thus 
produce acquittal. 
page 10 } Defendant's Instruct-ion D 
The Court instructs the jury that in order o justify a con~ 
viction, the evidence must be to exclude e ery reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence and be consistent onl with the guilt 
of the defendant; that every fact necessary to a verdict of 
guilty must be proved beyond a reasonab]e oubt, and that 
if there be a reasonable doubt as to any f abt necessary to 
convict they shall find the defendant not gui y. 
Defendant's Instruction Il. 
The Court instructs the jury that the def ndant had the 
right to .testify in his own behalf and the jur have no right 
to arbitrarily disreg·ard or disbelieve his ev dence in whole 
or in part merely because he is on trial charg d with a crime, 
but it is the duty of the jury to weig·h and c nsider his evi-
dence the same as that of any other witness nd give to his 
evicfonce such weight and credit as they think the same is en-
titled to, and to weigh his evidence under th same rules as 
they weigh the evidence of other witnesses te tifying in this 
case. 
Defendant's Instruction I. 
The Court instructs the jury that when the ood reputation 
of the defendant for truth and veracity i~ s own, it should 
be considered by them as highly important as o such facts as 
he testifies to in this case. 
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The following instructions were offered by the defendant 
but were refused by the Court, to which action of the Court 
in refusing to give the said instructions the defendant by coun-
sel duly excepted. 
Defendant's Instruction E. 
The Court instructs the jury that the burden is upon the 
City of Lynchburg to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that 
the defendant at the time charged was driving his automo-
bile under the influence of intoxicants, to such an extent that 
his ability to drive with safety to himself and others was 
thereby materially impaired, and if the City of Lynchburg 
fails to carry this burden then it is your sworn duty to acquit 
the defendant of driving· under the influence of intoxicants. 
page 11 ~ The defendant objected to the ruling of the 
Court in refusing to give Instruction .E on the 
grounds that it properly stated the law, and that the burden 
was upon the City of Lynchburg to prove that the defendant's 
ability to drive with safety to himself and others was ma-
teriaHy impaired, and without this instruction the jury was 
not fully instructed on the law as to driving under the in-
fluence of intoxicants, which objections the Court overruled, 
and the defendant by counsel duly excepted to the ruling of 
the Court. 
Defendant's Instruction F. 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence in this case, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant on October 4, 1938, was operating his automoqile 
under the influence of intoxicants, upon the highway in the 
City of Lynchburg, they should find him guilty of driving· 
under the influence of intoxicants and should fix his punish-
ment by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more 
than one thousand dollars, or by imprisoment for not less than 
one month nor more than six months, either or both, in the 
di8cretion of the jury. 
If they find him not guilty of driving under the influence 
of intoxicants, hut believe from the evidence., beyond all rea-
sonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of reckless driv-
ing, they should find him guilty of reckless driving and fix 
llis punishment at a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more 
tlian one hundred jlollars, or by both such fine and imprison-
nu'.\nt. in the discretion of the jury. 
If they find him not guilty they shall say so and no more. 
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The defendant objected to the ruling of th Court in re-
fusing to give this instruction on the grounds that reckless 
driving is a minor or lesser offense than driv ng under the 
influence of intoxicants, and that reckless dri · ing is an in-
gredient of driving under the influ ce of intoxi-
page 12 ~ cants, that the jury was not fully in tructed as to 
the law without this instruction, an that the de-
fendant was entitled to this instruction,-which bjections the 
Court overruled and the defendant by counsel uly excepted 
to the ruling of the Court. · 
DefendOJnt's Instruction G. 
The Court instructs the jury that the defe dant in this 
case is charged with two separate and distinc offenses, to-
wit, driving under the influence of intoxicants and reckless 
driving, both of which are punishable at the ju 's discretion 
within the limits set out in Instruction F; th4t if the jury 
should believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, th* the def end-
ant is guilty of some offense charged against im but have 
a reasonable doubt as to the offense of whic he is guilty, 
it would be their duty to give him the benefit f said doubt 
and convict him of the lesser offense, reckless driving, and 
punish him accordingly. 
The defendant· objected to the ruling of the Court in re-
fusing to give Instruction G on the grounds hat the jury 
were not fully instructed as to the law in this case without 
this instruction, that the defendant was entitl d to this in-
struction, that the law is well settled that where the jury may 
find the defendant guilty of some offense but h ve a reason-
able doubt as to the offense of which he is gui y, it is their 
duty to convict him of the lesser offense, and e charge of 
reckless driving is a lesser offense than drivi g under the 
influence of intoxicants,-which objections the Court over-
ruled and the defendant by counsel duly except d to the rul-
ing of the Court. 
page 13 ~ I, Aubrey E. Strode, Judge of th Corporation 
Court for the City of Lynchburg, irg'inia, who 
presided over the foregoing trial of City of Ly chburg v. J. 
E. Spickard in said court, at Lynchburg, Vir inia, on the 
18th day of November, 1938, do certify that th foregoing is 
a true and correct copy and report of all the vidence that 
was introduced, and other incidents of the tr al, including 
all the _ins~ructions reques.ted, amended, given and refused, 
and obJections and exceptions thereto, as here nabove indi-
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· cated, ali ·questions raised, rulings thereon, and exceptions 
thereto, in the above named cause. And I do further certify 
that the Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Lynch-
burg, opposing· counsel of record, has had reasonable notice 
in writing, g·iven by counsel for the defendant, J. E. Spickard, 
. of the time and place when· the foregoing report of the testi-
mony and other incidents of said trial would be tendered and 
presented to the undersigned for sig-nature and authentica-
tion. · 
Given under my hand and seal this 25th day of January, 
1.939, within 60 days after the entry of final judgment in this 
cause. 
AUBREY E. STRODE, (Seal) 
Judge of the Corporation Court for the 
City of Lynchburg, Virginia. 
I, H. H. Martin, Clerk of the Corporation Court for the 
City of Lynchburg, Virginia, do certify that the foregoing 
report of the testimony and other incidents of the trial of 
the case of City of Lynchburg v. ,T. E. Spickard, which has 
beeu duly authenticated by the Judge of said Court, was 
lodged and filed by me as Clerk of said Court, on 
page 14 ~ the 26th day of January, 1939. 
Given under my hand and seal this 26th day of 
January, 1939. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, (Seal) 
Clerk of the Corporation Court for the 
City of Lynchburg, Virginia. 
page 15 ~ I, H. H. Martin, Clerk of the Corporation Court 
for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, do certify 
that the foregoing is a true transcript of the record of the 
case of City of Lynchburg· v. J. E. Spickard, and I further 
certify that notices as required by Section 6253-f and Section 
6339 of the Code of Virg'inia were duly g-iven, as appears by 
paper writings filed with the record of said case. 
The fee for making this transcript is $5.00. 
Given under my hand this 26th day of January, 1939. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, 
Clerk of the Corporation Court for the 
City of Lynchburg, Virginia. 
A Copy-.Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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